

Peking's Present Policy towards Taiwan
and Prospects for PRC-ROC Relations
Problems of the Unification of China

(中共의 台湾政策分析 및 中共·台湾 關係展望)

보 관 용

(관 리 과)

國土統一院

- I. 이 책은 国土統一院의 政策調査研究計劃에 依拠한 特殊課題 研究報告書임.
- II. 収録된 內容은 刊行처의 意見을 반드시 反映하는 것은 아니며 統一問題에 關聯된 研究에 資料로 提供되는 것임.

Peking's Present Policy towards Taiwan and Prospects for PRC-ROC Relations

— Problems of the Unification of China —

(中共의 台灣政策分析 및 中共·台灣 關係展望)

by **William Hsu**

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要 約 및 結 論

筆者는 本 論文에서 中国統一에 대한 中共·臺灣 兩側의 政策的 立場을 概觀하고, 北京側의 統一戰略과 臺北側의 対応戰略을 分析하여 中国統一過程에서 決定的으로 作用하는 諸要素를 檢出, 앞으로의 進展可能性 및 蓋然性を 評價함으로써 中国統一에 관하여 假設적으로 展望하였다.

먼저 現況을 概觀하면, 北京側의 積極적인 提議와 臺北側의 頑強한 拒否態度로 말미암아 兩者關係는 막다른 膠着狀態에 있는 것처럼 透視된다 하더라도 이것은 오히려 膠着을 打開해가는 한 側面이라고 分析된다.

다시 말하면 이것은 最近에 와서 雙方이 相對方에 대한 極限적인 敵對用語 使用을 抑制하고, 相對方 住民의 福利增進을 위하여 援助- 臺北側은 農業技術을, 北京側은 原油를 提供- 할 意思를 表示하고 있다는 것이 더 重要的 事實로 指摘될 수 있다는데 緣由한다.

北京側의 統一戰略과 臺北側의 対応戰略을 豫想·分析해볼 때, 北京側은 앞으로 臺灣에 대하여 攻勢적인 压力과 柔和적인 說得능 強·穩 兩策을 併行하여 驅使할 것이며 臺灣側은 頑強한 拒否속에서 政治的 逆攻을 試圖하리라 보여진다.

즉 北京側은 臺灣에 外交的孤立과 經濟的 窒息을 企圖하는등 政治的 压力을 加함과 더불어 統一戰線式 攻勢와 浸透, 海·空軍 또는 空輪特攻隊나 水陸兩用軍에 의한 寄襲, 金門島 및 馬祖島에 대한 軍事行動등 強硬한 攻勢的 方法과; 對話促求, 經濟協力 提示, 臺灣 指導層에 대한 政治的 保障, 憲法体制上的 讓步등 柔和적인 方法등

兩面戰術을 適切히 配合하여 行使할 것으로 展望된다.

반면 臺灣側은 頑強한 拒否속에 宣傳面에서 逆攻을 試圖하면서 協商의 主導權을 掌握, 이데올로기에 대한 經濟發展의 誇示, 中共의 對話・交流提議에 대한 伸縮性있는 対応등 政治的 攻勢를 加할 可能性이 보이고, 그 外에 소위 "러시안카드"와 核抑止戰略을 驅使하면서 漸進적으로 適應해 나아갈 것 같다.

筆者는 이어서 中國統一에 있어 決定的인 要素로서,

1. 北京-모스크바-臺北 三角關係, 2. 北京-워싱턴-臺北 三角關係, 3. 正統性 問題, 4. 所謂 "臺灣化"와 自由中國의 安定性, 5. 所謂 "5部門 現代化"와 中共의 安定性, 6. 民族主義 意識 등을 檢出하여 分析하였다.

특히 첫번째 要素中에 臺灣・蘇聯 同盟可能性에 대하여는 이를 詳細히 檢討해볼 때 그 實現性이 심히 否定的이다. 즉 "臺灣이 蘇聯과 同盟할 可能性이 있을 경우에는 그 必要性이 없고, 必要性이 생길 경우에는 그 可能性이 없다"는 理由들을 分明히 發見할 수 있다.(6가지 理由)

다음 將來 問題의 展開에 있어, 그 可能性 및 蓋然性을 評價해 보고 統一possible한 方法들을 例示해 보았다. 즉 檢出해낸 6가지 要素들의 進展可能性 및 蓋然性들을 各各 細部的으로 豫想・評價하고 나아가 豫想possible한 統一方案들을 크게 3가지로 나누어 分析을 가하였다.

끝으로 筆者는 가까운 將來에 展開될 諸樣相을 2段階로・集約하여 判斷하였다.

第1段階는 向後 5-10年間으로서 이 期間중에

1. 中共과 蘇聯間의 冷戰危險성이 크다.
2. 中共과 美国間에는 微溫的인 關係가 維持된다.
3. 正統性 問題에 있어 北京과 臺北은 여전히 非妥協的이다.
4. 5. 中共, 臺灣은 각각 상당히 高度의 安定을 維持한다.
6. 그러나 民族主義感情은 長期間의 分斷으로 인하여 일단은 褪

色한다는 前提下에,

中共의 壓力과 “一括妥結”에 의한 統一方式이 가장 浮刻되겠지만 이것은 거의 不可能하다는데 歸結하였다.

그러나 第2段階 즉 向後 10-20年間に

1. 中共과 蘇聯間의 關係는 蘇聯의 膨脹主義로 危險한 狀態에 든다.
2. 中共·美国間도 公式的인 同盟에까지는 이르지 못할 것이다.
3. 正統性 問題에 있어 北京과 臺北 모두가 妥協的이다.
4. 5. 中共·臺灣 모두 큰 危機없이 高度의 安定을 維持한다.
6. 民族主義 感情은 平和統一에 대한 강한 希求로 다시 蘇生할 것이라는 前提下에, 든다.

1990年代에는 雙方 相互間의 調節을 通하여 統一이 實現될 수 있다고 본다.

즉 向後 5年 以内에는 統一이 不可能하다. 그러나 今世紀末頃에는 平和統一이 實現될 可能性이 극히 크다고 본다. 아울러 蘇聯의 膨脹主義追求가 中國統一에 絶對的인 影響을 끼칠것으로 보이므로 이에 대하여 보다 깊은 研究가 行해져야 된다고 본다.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study to assess the possibilities and probabilities in the future development of China towards unification. Any assessment of this kind necessarily involves an element of subjective judgement; but a conscientious effort is made to maintain the objective view of an impartial observer. What we are concerned with in this paper is what are likely, or unlikely, to happen, not what should, or should not, be done.

The unification -- or 'reunification' as the term is used in English publications from Peking -- of China became an issue thirty years ago with the establishment of the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the retreat of the Government of the Republic of China to the province of Taiwan. In the earlier years, Peking repeatedly vowed to 'liberate Taiwan' and Taipei repeatedly vowed to 'counterattack against the mainland.' In 1958, Peking started bombardment of Quemoy and other offshore islands held by ROC forces. At first it was a serious attempt to take these islands as a preliminary step for attacking Taiwan itself; but the effort failed, and the intensive bombardment de-escalated to a ridiculous 'bombardment only on odd-number days on the calendar.' Even this soon stopped in practice, though not in theory; and it continued till

January 1, 1979, as a symbolic state of war to signify that the civil war was still going on.

As nothing could be accomplished in attempts to 'liberate' Taiwan by force, Peking gradually shifted its emphasis to calls for peaceful unification. With the diplomatic breakthroughs in Kissinger's 1971 visit to Peking, the takeover of ROC's UN seat in 1971, and the Shanghai Communique in 1972, Peking's position was dramatically strengthened, and the unification issue entered a new stage. Gradually, the militant slogan 'counterattack against the mainland' disappeared in ROC propaganda; and gradually Peking stepped up its calls for a peaceful unification. While the process of 'normalization' between Peking and Washington moved along at a creeping pace, practical relations between PRC and the U.S. flourished. Taipei lingered over the hope that the status quo could be maintained indefinitely, that the diplomatic ties between ROC and the U.S. might not have to be formally severed. But this was not going to be the case. Inevitably, the axe fell; and the issue of unification was thrust into another new stage.

In this study, we shall not dwell upon the developments in the past years, but rather concentrate on the possible developments in the future. We shall briefly review the current situation, analyze the potential approaches from Peking and the conceivable reactions from Taipei, then single out the decisive factors in the process of unification, make assessments on possibilities and probabilities

in the future, and draw a tentative conclusion for the prospects of the unification of China.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

On December 15, 1978, it was announced in Washington and Peking that formal diplomatic relationship between PRC and US would be established on January 1, 1979. This brought an end to the long process of PRC-US 'normalization' and the start of a new chapter in the longer process leading towards the unification of China. Peking immediately intensified its propaganda campaign directed to Taiwan, calling for peaceful unification; and Taipei, as was to be expected, rejected these overtures. The current position of Peking may be represented by the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978 and published on January 1, 1979; and the current position of Taipei may be represented by Premier Sun Yun-suan's Address at the Opening Ceremony of the First National Development Seminar of 1979, delivered on July 7, 1979. The following are excerpts of key passages in these two documents:

A. Peking's Proposal

The "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" adopted by N.P.C. Standing Committee states: -

... Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so

as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses....

We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation.... We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese Government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

... We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.

... Construction is going ahead vigorously on the motherland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and carry out economic exchanges.

On the day this Message was published, Deng Xiao-ping talked at a meeting of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and said: "On

this day, the great task of returning Taiwan to the motherland and accomplishing the unification of our nation is placed on a concrete timetable."

B. Taipei's Position

Premier Sun Yun-suan's address on July 7, 1979 states: -

For the last 30 years, the government and people of the Republic of China have endeavored to develop freedom and democracy, provide progress and prosperity, and assure a life of stability, peace and happiness. We have tried to make this a blueprint for reconstruction of the whole country -- to present a unified new China of wealth, strength and liberty. Thanks to the hard work of our compatriots at home and the encouragement and support of the overseas Chinese, the Republic of China has recorded outstanding achievements in political, economic, social and cultural undertakings. Our compatriots on the mainland have envied us for these achievements.

The question of national unification is the common concern of our people at home and abroad. I have explained our basic position in these words: "Peace and unification has always been the aspiration of all the Chinese people, but the unified country we seek is one which stands for world peace. It is a country which has a democratic and constitutional government serving the welfare of the people. It is one which adheres to the free enterprise system and guarantees human rights and the private ownership of property."

Today, I regrettably must note that everything the Chinese Communists have done in the last 30 years runs counter to these principles. This means we must shoulder the great and heavy responsibility of China's unification and reconstruction. We do not seek well-being today while neglecting that of the thousand years to come.

Nor are we seeking the well-being of the thousand years to come while neglecting today. We are thinking of both today and the centuries to come. We are responsible not only to the Chinese of this generation but also to the generations of the future. We are responsible for the historical continuity of the Chinese nation. We cannot be content with our accomplishments of the moment but must continue to strive for complete success in our great endeavor of national unification.

Premier Sun Yun-suan's address says: "I have explained our basic position in these words: 'Peace and unification private ownership of property.'" It implies that 'these words' had been published before; but it is doubtful whether these exact words could be found in a previous publication. However, there was indeed a news release on January 12, 1979, reporting that Premier Sun had given a talk on the subject, in which he said: -

... What we, the Chinese people, need is a World of Great Harmony of the traditional Chinese ideals, not a unification of the style of The First Emperor of Chin Dynasty; what we need is a free and open horizon, not a cage in which people keep each other in surveillance; what we need is a modernized society in which people share wealth, not some backward communes in which people share poverty..... If the Chinese Communists dare to face reality, they should immediately accept the clearly expressed wishes of the mainland people: get rid of Marxist-Leninist ideology, give up World Revolution, abolish Communist dictatorship, protect human rights and liberties, disband people's communes and return people's properties.... Only when our compatriots, living in the country or abroad, rally around

the Government of the Republic of China, will it be possible to re-establish a strong and unified, free and democratic, progressive and prosperous New China.

The wording is somewhat different from the address of July 7, 1979; but the essence is the same.

Also of great importance is a statement by Dr. Lee Tsung-tao, Director of the Agricultural Development Commission of the Executive Yuan. The United Daily in Taipei reported on July 5, 1979 an interview with Dr. Lee, in which he said: -

... Our agricultural development has won international acclaim. In the past thirty years we have provided agricultural technology to many developing countries.... If the Chinese Communists should decide to use Taiwan as a model for their program of agricultural modernization, we would be delighted to supply them, out of humanitarian considerations, with necessary technological materials, because this would be helpful for the improvement of the living conditions of our compatriots on the mainland.

President Chiang Ching-kuo himself has also spoken out on the Peking proposals for association between the mainland and Taiwan. On May 3, 1979, he gave an interview to Marsh Clark of TIME magazine; the following is a part of the interview: -

Clark: "Do you think that in the foreseeable future there is any possibility for ROC to improve its relations with Communist China, any way for establishing some ties, such as trade and direct postal service?"

President: "I wish to call the attention of our friends to the fact that any 'contacts' or 'ties' would just be

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President: "I wish to call the attention of our friends to the fact that any 'contacts' or 'ties' would just be

a tool used by the Chinese Communists to undermine our psychological defenses against Communism. Having understood their aim, we cannot help them in their attempt to crack our defences."

And President Chiang Ching-kuo made the following remarks in a conversation with a correspondent of U.S. News & World Report, excerpts of which, published in that journal of July 23, 1979, run as follows:

On invasion from the mainland, "It is, of course, a possibility. Faced with internal and external pressures, the Chinese Communists will use fair means or foul to spread rumors of peace abroad while they try to infiltrate and subvert us.... Their intention is as plain as the nose on your face."

On Peking's proposals for nonpolitical ties with Taipei. "In mainland China, people cannot buy food without coupons and cannot go anywhere without travel permits. They have no freedom of education and no free choice of occupation. If the Chinese Communists deny such fundamental freedoms to their own people, how can they have the effrontery to talk about communications and relations with the outside world? They are simply being deceitful."

On establishing closer relations with the Soviet Union. "Our basic position is to remain in the democratic camp and never to communicate with any Communist country, including the Soviet Union, regardless of who takes the initiative. Soviet Russia helped the Chinese Communists usurp the mainland. Having been subjected to the Communist scourge, the Republic of China will not be so naive as to accept the thesis that 'an enemy of an enemy is a friend.'"

Besides, on August 2, 1979, the Central News Agency of ROC reported that President Chiang Ching-kuo had given an interview to a weekly publication of South Africa, in which he said: "Unification is the common wish of the Chinese people; however, the unification of China must be based on the foundation of freedom and democracy, and all ideologies and institutions of despotic dictatorship and collective economy must be abolished. At the present time, the people in China mainland are striving in this direction. In the foreseeable future, when the Chinese Communist regime -- which is against human nature, human rights, freedom and democracy -- is eventually overthrown, the unification of China will naturally follow."

C. A Changing Deadlock

So, these are the present positions of Peking and Taipei on the issue of unification. Peking is still beckoning, and Taipei is still standing firm with a stonewall posture. It is apparently a deadlock; but it is a changing deadlock. As compared with thirty years ago, twenty years ago, ten years ago, or even one year ago, the situation is already quite different. Peking no longer refers to the ROC government in Taipei as 'Chiang bandits' or 'Chiang clique'; it is now 'the Taiwan authorities.' Taipei no longer refers to the PRC government as 'Communist bandits' (though the term is not yet completely obsolete); it is now 'the Chinese Communists.' 'Liberation of Taiwan' and 'Counterattack against the Mainland' are also obsolescent slogans. Taipei used to be adamant against the admission

of PRC as a member of the International Olympics Committee, but is now apparently prepared to accept the proposal to give membership to PRC along with the membership for ROC.

What is of greater importance is the demonstration of a new willingness on both sides to help promote the welfare of the people on the other side. The N.P.C. Standing Committee wishes greater prosperity for Taiwan; and Dr. Lee Tsung-tao wishes to help improve the living conditions of PRC people. Dr. Lee says ROC is prepared to offer agricultural technology to the mainland; and a Deputy Director of Agricultural Programs Commission of PRC State Council said on September 26, 1979, at a news conference that the PRC government welcomed such exchange of agricultural technology; besides, PRC Vice Premier Geng Biao says that Peking is prepared to sell oil to Taiwan. All these are of course quite inconceivable one year ago.

* Following this response from Peking, a ROC Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Taipei that Dr. Lee had been 'misquoted'; but Dr. Lee himself said 'no comment' to questions of reporters on this.

III. POTENTIAL STRATEGIES OF PEKING

A. Offensive Pressures

It is a common view that Peking does not have, and will not have in the foreseeable future, the military capacity to invade and occupy Taiwan. In a superficial sense, this view is essentially correct. But it does not mean that Peking will never possess this capacity; nor does it mean that Peking does not have the capacity to exert increasingly severe pressures against ROC that could conceivably bring it to its knees without resorting to the ultimate action of a full-fledged invasion.

Offensive pressures that Peking could exert against Taiwan include the following steps, some of which are in progress, while others are held in reserve due to various considerations.

1. Diplomatic isolation. The effort to isolate ROC started long ago, and attained breakthroughs with the UN seat-change in 1971, the Nixon/Tanaka visits in 1972, and the establishment of formal relations with Japan, and the United States and many other countries in the following years. By now, ROC is recognized by only 21 countries, nearly all inconsequential small countries. This trend is continuing to develop, and it is not impossible that Peking will eventually force ROC into a state of complete isolation and orphanization, so far as formal diplomatic relations are concerned.

ROC authorities console their supporters that ROC still enjoy substantial economic relationship with about 100 countries. But it should be realized that such relations exist only on the sufferance of Peking. It is true that Peking is not yet capable of forcing countries that recognize PRC to cut their economic ties with Taiwan, which is a main reason why such ties are being tolerated by Peking. But one must not assume that Peking will never be in a position to cause these countries to reduce or even to cut off their economic ties with Taiwan.

2. United-front harassment. Peking has intensified its psychological warfare against ROC. With sweet smiles and magnanimous words, Peking makes appeals for peaceful unification. While no favorable response is expected from KMT, at least not in the present stage, this approach is designed to put KMT on the defensive, to erode the anti-Communist resolve of the Taiwan people, to soften opponents in the United States, to gain support in international public opinion, and to lay the foundation for the justification of a later switch to belligerency against ROC.

More subtle tactics could be adopted in this psychological game, e.g. arousing the confrontation between Taiwanese and Mainlanders in Taiwan, playing KMT liberals against KMT old guards, demoralizing ROC armed forces which are composed largely of Taiwanese youths, and enlisting the support of overseas Chinese intellectuals to create pressure on KMT to negotiate for peaceful unification.

3. Political pressures. When circumstances ripen, Peking could change to a hard line. Instead of amiable overtures, it could assume a stringent voice to demand ROC authorities to come to the negotiation table; it could persuade the United States and other countries that retain some influence over Taiwan to give KMT friendly advice to yield; it could demand the United States and other countries to stop supplying ROC with arms, and even to stop economic relations with Taiwan which is, as everyone says, just a province of China; it could call upon the Taiwanese people to rise against the KMT leaders from the mainland; it could appoint a "Provisional Taiwan Provincial Government" and make a military buildup on the western side of the Taiwan Straits.

4. Economic suffocation. A heavier blow could be dealt when and if Peking takes steps to strangle the economy of Taiwan. Threatening gestures would be enough to scare away foreign investment and to cause an exodus of local capital and local people. Declaring a sort of civil war against an intransigent and illegal provincial government, Peking could announce a blockade for the area. All ships and airplanes going to Taiwan would be required to get clearance from Peking, or run the risk of being sunk or shot down by the PLA. Foreign countries can hardly challenge Peking's legal rights for such a blockade, which can become increasingly effective, especially if Peking takes some actions to show that it means business. The effect on

Taiwan economy and Taiwan society would be severe.

5. Action against Quemoy and Matsu. These vulnerable islands could be attacked, to pave the way for military actions against Taiwan Island, and to induce ROC forces to come out and fight in areas nearer PLA bases. The United States stood behind ROC during Peking's 1958 offensive against Quemoy, but not again.

6. Infiltration and air-borne attack. Propaganda materials, safe-conduct for deserters, counterfeit Taiwan banknotes could be dropped on Taiwan by airplanes or balloons. Even some small firearms could be dropped, calling upon the people who pick them up to use the arms against ROC security forces. Spies and commandos could be sent by submarines and parachutes.

7. Naval and air raids. Submarines and torpedo boats could be used to attack ROC navy and commercial ships. Strongly concentrated contingents of air force could be dispatched to penetrate Taiwan's air defence at weaker points. Ground-to-ground missiles could be fired to destroy important military installations.

8. Amphibian landing and invasion. With the accumulative effects of the above steps brought to a climax, with panic and demoralisation widespread in a besieged Taiwan, Peking may not have to take this final step; if it has to, it could be within its military capacity under those circumstances.

B. Appeasing Inducements

Apart from the hard-line described above, Peking could adopt a soft-line, offering various appealing terms to induce ROC leaders to consider testing the road of a negotiated peaceful unification. Such an approach would have some attraction, because it could exploit the sentiments of patriotism and nationalism, and it could offer to spare Taiwan from the potential disaster of the hard-line. The specific offers would be, or could be, in the following four categories.

1. Establishment of communications. This includes direct postal connection, exchange of civilian and official visits, exchange of cultural delegations, and other offers made in the open letter of the PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee on January 1, 1979.

2. Economic cooperation. This would include direct trade, the offer to supply Taiwan with crude oil, the exchange of technology and economic delegations, the promise to gradually increase imports from Taiwan and to assist Taiwan in expanding its foreign markets. And there is the implicit advantage for Taiwan to spend less in military expenditure.

3. Political assurance. This would include the guarantee not to impose a new government in Taiwan, not to throw out any KMT leaders, not to disband or reorganize the ROC army, not to change the economic and social structure of Taiwan, or to lower the standard of living of the people. And there would be a fairly generous offer for the personal position of Chiang Ching-kuo. A minimum offer would be a

Vice-chairmanship on the Standing Committee of the PRC National People's Congress. Peking may revive the position of "State Chairmanship," and promise to nominate Chiang Ching-kuo as the "Vice Chairman" or even the "Chairman of the State."

4. Constitutional concessions. It is improbable, but not inconceivable that Peking would offer to revise the PRC Constitution so as to make peaceful unification more palatable for ROC leaders. It could offer to adopt a new national flag, a new national anthem, even a new national name. It might accept "The Republic of China" as an "abbreviated form" of "The People's Republic of China," or even to agree to "abbreviate" the existing name of "The People's Republic of China" into "The Republic of China" which, it may be said, was proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to whom CCP has kept its respect.

At the ideological level, Peking could agree not to mention explicitly the terms of "Communism" and "The Communist Party of China" in the new Constitution of a unified nation.

On the status of Taiwan, Peking could agree to grant it the status of a fully autonomous region, or a dominion; and it could offer to reorganize the structure of a unified nation into a federation or a confederation.

C. Combination of Soft and Hard Lines

In the future strategy for national unification, it is conceivable that Peking would depend primarily upon the hard-

line of offensive pressures, using appeasing inducements only as occasional psychological weapons -- a velvet glove to cover the iron fist. It is also conceivable that Peking would depend primarily upon the soft-line of appeasing inducements, keeping its capability to exert offensive pressures in the background as a potential threat, but refraining from brandishing this capacity. It is more probable that the hard-line and the soft-line will be used in combination, or more-or-less in alternation, depending on the requirements in various stages.

How the "carrot" and the "stick" are to be used will be largely determined by the factors to be analysed in Section V.

IV. CONCEIVABLE REACTIONS FROM TAIPEI

While Taipei is generally put on the defensive, its reactions do not necessarily have all to be defensive in nature. In fact, there is much that Taipei could do to take advantage of Peking's various approaches and to launch counter-offensives. The conceivable reactions from Taipei include the following strategies.

A. Stonewall Rejection

The initial reaction of Taipei to Peking's new overtures of peaceful unification can only be a categorical rejection. "Hell, no! We won't go!" is the natural and inevitable reply. The long-established policy of no-negotiation-with-Communists is reconfirmed; promises to recover the mainland and unify the whole nation under ROC regime are reiterated. The new PRC administration under Deng Xiao-ping is denounced as simply another phase of the CCP tyranny, and the Peking proposals dismissed as merely united-front tactics.

Such a rejection is necessary of course, for the sake of assuaging anxieties in Taiwan and preventing confusion in KMT. But the KMT leaders probably realize that the "New New-China" under Deng is essentially different from the "New China" under Mao, that the Peking overtures this time will not fade away like previous times, and that a stonewall rejection will not be sufficient to ensure the status quo of Taiwan indefinitely.

B. Propaganda Countermeasures

In addition to denouncing the new Peking regime and discrediting its peace-offensive, Taipei has undertaken some propaganda counter-measures, which it had not bothered to do in previous years. These have included notably Premier Sun Yun-hsuen's statement of the terms for acceptable unification and Dr. Lee Tsung-tao's public offer of agricultural technology to PRC. This is a positive reaction. And it has profound meaning, because it could change in its nature, from mere propaganda countermeasures into really meaningful political counter-offensives.

C. Political Counteroffensives

It is likely that most members in the KMT leadership would want to stop at the present extent of propaganda counter-measures, and do not dare to venture further with potentially dangerous political counteroffensives. But quite possibly many far-sighted leaders are realizing that it is not enough to blunt the edge of Peking's unification drive, that sooner or later KMT will have to come to grips in a political struggle against CCP which KMT has shunted for decades, and that, for the sake of the survival of KMT and ROC, an active and offensive strategy, though risky, is absolutely necessary. To remain passively on the defensive would definitely lead to ultimate defeat and disaster. The ostrich that buries its head in the sand cannot survive the attacking enemy.

KMT has stressed repeatedly in past long years that the

task of counterattacking the CCP and recovering the mainland would be "thirty percent military and seventy percent political. This has been essentially a slogan to disguise ROC's embarrassing inability to do much in the military field. Little has really been done in the field of political counterattack, apart from the efforts to build up a more liberal and prosperous Taiwan, to be held up in contrast against the political oppression and economical backwardness in mainland China. Now, with the overtures of peaceful unification from Peking -- which can be expected to intensify rather than fade away in coming years -- there is a challenging opportunity for Taipei to really engage itself in that "seventy percent of political counterattack" promised in its slogan, not only for the sake of maintaining the status quo, but also as a serious attempt to bring about political revolution in mainland China, and to fulfill its long-cherished dream of unifying the nation under ROC rule, or under a new political framework congenial to the Three Principles of the People.

Conceivably, Taipei could take three basic approaches in such political counteroffensives.

1. To take the initiative in organizing negotiations. Instead of avoiding the negotiation-table as if it were a burning stove, and instead of going to the table on Peking's terms like a defeated general being summoned by the victor, Taipei could take a positive and active approach to this problem, by taking the initiative in organizing negotiations. KMT leaders probably realize that negotiation is a major form

of political struggle, that its past defeats suffered in the negotiations with CCP are not a good reason for refusing to engage in such struggle again (just as a general cannot justify his refusal to go to the battlefield with the reason that he was defeated there), and that it is nonsense to say one cannot negotiate with CCP because they are not trustworthy (if so, one can scarcely negotiate with anybody).

Once KMT overcomes this psychological barrier, it could boldly and confidently call for a series of open negotiations, probably in the form of a new Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (or a similar name), to be held alternately in Taipei and Peking, and to be attended by representatives from a wide spectrum of influential groups, perhaps something like the following:

- a. KMT delegates - 20%
- b. CCP delegates - 20%
- c. Delegates of other political parties in ROC - 10%
- d. Delegates of other political parties in PRC - 10%
- e. Non-partisan leaders in Taiwan - 10%
- f. Non-partisan leaders in Mainland - 10%
- g. Overseas Chinese intellectuals invited by KMT - 10%
- h. Overseas Chinese intellectuals invited by CCP - 10%

Such a composition would result in a sort of fifty-fifty division of a pro-CCP group and a pro-KMT group; but the former would be speaking and voting in unison, while the latter would be less tightly controlled. To prevent the Conference from being dominated by pro-CCP votes, Taipei could make it a pre-condition that resolutions could only pass with a two-thirds vote.

2. To focus negotiations on ideologies and accomplishments.

While Peking would probably try to focus the negotiations on political bargaining over the question of how Taiwan is to be integrated into a unified nation, the pro-KMT delegates could insist on issues of principle: human rights; the fallacy of Communism; the right and wrong ways for economic reconstruction, etc. And, equally important, they could make a systematic comparative review of the accomplishments in PRC and in ROC in the past thirty years: degrees of political freedom and stability; rates of economic growth; levels of educational and cultural advancement; differences in standards of living, etc. In short, pro-KMT delegates could make it a strong platform to criticise the past performance of CCP and its present wrong policies, to publicize the accomplishments of ROC, to put CCP on trial in the eyes of the Chinese people, to cultivate pro-KMT sentiments in mainland China and to arouse the mainland people against CCP.

3. To allow communications and exchange between PRC and ROC

In the meantime, Taipei could accept, with courage and confidence Peking's proposals for direct communications, exchanges and trade between PRC and ROC. Taipei might realize that there is really nothing to be afraid of from such exchanges, that there is great advantage in allowing the mainland people (civilians as well as PRC officials) to come and see for themselves how Taiwan is prospering, and in allowing some Taiwan people to go and see how people in PRC are suffering. It might also realize that economic cooperation with PRC could benefit

Taiwan more than it could benefit PRC, and that such cooperation is conducive to eventual liberation or liberalization of PRC.

Certainly there are inherent risks involved in such political counteroffensives; but, Taipei might come to the conclusion that not to take such measures would involve much graver risks, and that attack is the best defence.

D. Gradual Accommodation

This is the passive way of reaction based on indecision and lack of insight. Resistance against the strategy of political counteroffensives would remain strong in the KMT leadership, so strong that it might prevent the KMT from making any meaningful response to the increasing pressures from Peking, and Taipei could be compelled to yield gradually, going step by step to ultimate defeat.

As a matter of fact, in recent years Taipei has already taken a few steps away from its original militant position against CCP. The term of "Communist bandits" is no longer used invariably in references to PRC or CCP. Co-existence in the International Olympic Games is no longer unacceptable. The potential invasion of PRC against Taiwan is denounced as "aggression," a term usually used for foreign enemies. Agricultural technology is offered to promote the living standard of mainland people.

The offer of agricultural technology is particularly noteworthy, because it implies clearly a willingness to give assistance to some phases of the Four Modernisations of PRC, to tolerate a stabilized new regime in the mainland, and to

go into some sort of economic cooperation with Peking.

However, Taipei is evidently reluctant to go further along this road, and is inclined to adopt a passive attitude of wait-and-see, still hoping that somehow something would happen in PRC, so that ROC would be spared from intolerable pressures from Peking.

This is of course not impossible. But, Chairman Mao is dead, and Taipei can no longer depend upon him to do something to disrupt the PRC regime as he frequently did. And USSR cannot be depended upon forever to pose a threat against PRC so that Peking cannot shift its attention to a solution of the Taiwan Problem. It is conceivable that a certain level of reconciliation between Moscow and Peking is reached, so that Peking can gradually exert offensive pressures against ROC as outlined in Section III. If Taipei is not prepared to take active political counterattacks, it would have no alternative but to try its best to cope with such pressures as they come. This would be a most humiliating and distressful process. Taipei would have to go meekly to the negotiation table, struggling helplessly, to accept surrender terms dictated by CCP. Or, as an alternative to gradual accommodation and eventual surrender, ROC could resist defiantly and futilely, fighting desperately every inch of the way leading to final collapse, causing a lot of destruction along the way.

4. The "Russian Card"

There has been much speculation on the possibility of the

"Russian Card" being played by Taipei, as a countermeasure against Peking's pressure. While it is possibly desirable for Taipei to appear to keep this option open, it is not really very possible for Taipei to establish a sort of special relationship with USSR under present and future circumstances. (For an analysis of this issue, see Section V.) Nevertheless, it is a conceivable reaction that should not be neglected.

F. Nuclear Deterrant

There has also been speculation that ROC may "go nuclear," so as to possess a formidable deterrant against potential PRC military pressures. Taipei has repeatedly denied that ROC is going to do this. The denial is creditable.

It is true that ROC has the capability to go nuclear, on the same level as Israel. But Israel is confronted with foreign enemies with no nuclear armament; ROC is confronted with a hostile force of the same nationality, and armed with already quite advanced nuclear armament. This makes all the difference. No one can seriously consider using atomic bombs in a civil war; and no one would seriously consider using atomic bombs first against an enemy equipped with superior nuclear armament. It is practically certain that Peking would never use nuclear weapons against Taiwan under any circumstances, whether ROC has nuclear weapons or not; so it is also practically certain that Taipei could never use such weapons under any circumstances. Thus, KMT leaders would definitely know there is no need, and no advantage, in possessing such weapons, even though the idea must have been contemplated again and again.

V. DECISIVE FACTORS FOR UNIFICATION

Among the various factors that influence the prospects of unification of China, the following are the most decisive ones: the Peking-Moscow-Taipei triangle, the Peking-Washington-Taipei triangle, the "Five Modernisations" and PRC stability, the "Taiwanization" and ROC stability, the issue of orthodoxy, and the sentiment of nationalism.

A. Peking-Moscow-Taipei Triangle

This is by far the most dominant factor regarding the future development of Peking's strategies for unification. While it is a triangle, we need only examine its two sides: the Peking-Moscow relationship and the possibility of a Moscow-Taipei linkage, because the third side -- the Peking-Taipei relationship is exactly the issue of unification on which we are trying to find an answer.

1. Moscow-Taipei linkage. There was this surprising visit of Victor Louis to Taipei in 1968; there were rumors about ROC officials meeting Russian officials in Eastern Europe; there was the provocative statement by former ROC Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai that "the enemy of our enemy could be our friend"; and there was the tantalizing comment in June 1976, by Chen Yu-ching (then Director of Overseas Programs of KMT Central Committee) that "the strategic position of Taiwan-Pascadores-Quemoy-Matsu has absolute importance in the U.S.-Russian struggle for sea power, thus the United States will never cut off diplomatic ties with ROC government and give up

her rights to utilize these all-important bases." Chen's remark might be interpreted as a hint that, once the United States cut off diplomatic ties with ROC, the right to utilize those bases could be switched over to the Russians. Now that the ties have indeed been cut off, is such a switch a real possibility?

While the publicly-stated position of ROC government is that no linkage with Moscow is contemplated, it is likely that Taipei would want people, especially leaders in Peking and Washington, to feel some uncertainty about this apparently-logical possibility. According to a senior American expert on China affairs, when President Ford and Secretary Kissinger visited Peking in 1975, Kissinger wanted to push forward towards formal diplomatic ties, but Peking cautioned that the matter must not be rushed, lest Taipei be provoked into a linkage with Moscow. If this report is reliable, it shows that Peking did have apprehensions for a Moscow-Taipei linkage.

However, while Taipei might want people to think that it has a "Russian Card" up in its sleeves, this option is actually only illusory. The Russian Card does not exist. This seemingly-shaky conclusion is based upon the following deductive reasoning:

Premise 1: When Taipei does not feel seriously threatened by PRC military pressure, it would not allow Russian bases in Taiwan area.

Premise 2: When Peking does not have a sort of détente with Moscow, it cannot pose serious military threat against Taiwan.

Premise 3: When Moscow reaches a sort of detente with Peking, it cannot engage itself in military bases in Taiwan.

Conclusion: When Taipei has the "possibility of linkage with Moscow," it does not have the "need for a linkage with Moscow"; but when Taipei has the "need for a linkage with Moscow," it will not have the "possibility of a linkage with Moscow."

It could be argued that Taipei might try to solve this dilemma by pre-emptive action, i.e. to establish (or at least attempt to establish) the linkage with Moscow before the need actually arises, when the possibility still exists. But this argument cannot stand, for the following reasons:

Reason 1: Generalissimo Chiang wrote a book Soviet Russia in China, condemning Russian aggressions against China, and strongly admonishing against the dangers of any future linkage with Moscow. KMT leaders can ignore this legacy only when it is commonly recognized that such a linkage is indeed needed as an absolutely necessary last-resort for ROC survival. It cannot be attempted when the situation is not desperate enough.

Reason 2: If Taipei does not set up a Moscow-linkage, Peking would adopt a relaxed military posture against ROC, and would not attempt to solve the Taiwan issue before it diffuses the military danger from the north. On the other hand, if Taipei does succeed in setting up such a linkage and allow Russians to build bases in Taiwan area, Peking would be enraged and alarmed, and would try to solve the Taiwan issue before it diffuses the threat from the north. Thus, such a linkage would only serve to intensify Peking's menace against

Taipei prematurely; it would create danger instead of diminishing it.

Reason 3: By the same token, Moscow would not want to have bases in Taiwan when a major war against PRC is not yet imminent, because such Russian bases would precipitate acute confrontation against PRC on all fronts, and would destroy prospects of any detente with Peking.

Reason 4: Moscow would probably desire naval supply-bases on the island of Taiwan; this would be useful for its operations in South Pacific and India Ocean. But such bases would have little value for the defence of Taiwan against PLA. Taipei might desire the Russians to set up naval and air bases on the Pascadores, as a defensive screen for Taiwan; but such bases would be hard to stand up on their own in case of PLA attack, and the Russians probably would not want to try it.

Reason 5: Taipei has scarcely any trust in Russians. Indeed, when it has been proven that even the Americans cannot be trusted, how can KMT trust the notorious Russians? Taipei probably does not even dare to make tentative approaches to Moscow, because the Russians could easily leak the secret overtures at some time to gain favors in Peking. Even if a Moscow-Taipei linkage is set up, Moscow could still betray Taipei any time for the sake of normalization with Peking. Even if USSR and ROC should collaborate in a war against PRC, and KMT succeed to reestablish its rule in the mainland, it would be impossible to drive the Russians out of China.

Reason 6: The last but not the least reason against any KMT attempt to set up a Moscow-linkage is that the KMT has a strong sentiment of nationalism. It was all right for ROC to seek American protection, because the United States is regarded as a non-aggressive super-power and a historical friend of China. But the Russians definitely are not so regarded. KMT would probably prefer total defeat, rather than going down in history as a treasonous party selling its soul to the devil for the sake of ignominious survival.

2. Moscow-Peking relationship. There have been two crucial factors that have prevented Peking to concentrate its attention to the "liberation of Taiwan": the intra-Party struggle and the confrontation against Soviet Russia; and the latter outweighs the former. It was reported a few years ago that a tipsy Russian diplomat said to an American official at a cocktail party in Europe: "You think it is the United States that has protected Taiwan from being attacked by Peking? Hell! How many troops you have in Taiwan? Without the half-a-million Soviet troops along the Siberian border, Peking would have taken Taiwan long ago!" There is much truth in that blunt remark.

The Soviet military build-up along the border started to intensify with the Chen-pao Island conflict in March 1969. The deployment of such a large army is not intended for defence, because it is inconceivable that Peking would want to invade Siberia under any circumstances. There is no possible advantage in such a move. So the Soviet army is there

solely for offensive purposes. It is meant as an instrument of political pressure; and, more important, it is held in readiness just in case Moscow decides to venture a major war against PRC.

There must have been many times in the past ten years that Moscow was tempted to take the plunge; but, for various reasons, it has refrained itself. Militarily, it was not impossible for the Soviet army to overwhelm the PLA and invade Northwest China, Northeast China, as well as North China; but to conquer the whole vast country of China was probably beyond its capacity. And the task of occupation would be ten times more difficult than the task of conquest. If only large parts of China are occupied, the continued war against the unoccupied part, combined with strong resistance in the occupied-area, could bog down the Soviet army, in a similar way as what happened to the Japanese invaders forty years ago. If the Soviet army manages to conquer the whole country of China, the size of the occupation force needed to hold down people's resistance and administer such a large country would be too large to be practicable.

It was, and still is, possible for the Soviet army to achieve somewhat limited objectives, such as the occupation of Sinkiang and/or parts of Manchuria. But the advantages would also be rather limited. Such moves cannot destroy the CCP regime; and, while they might weaken PRC strength in some tangible ways, they would, on the other hand, strongly consolidate the position of CCP in China, rally the Chinese

people around CCP in the holy cause of driving out foreign invaders, arouse world opinion against USSR, jeopardize detente with the United States, weaken Soviet control in East Europe, and even create troubles in USSR itself and in the Soviet leadership.

Having hesitated and dilly-dallied for ten long years, Moscow is now faced with four additional factors unfavorable for any major military venture in China: 1. the appearance of a new order under Deng Xiao-ping; 2. the increasingly creditable PRC nuclear deterrant; 3. the new Peking-Washington friendship; and 4. the old-age and poor-health of Moscow leaders.

There is another change in the situation that makes it less impelling for Moscow to make war against PRC: the nature of Peking's propaganda attacks against Moscow has changed. In the 1960's, it was essentially an ideological offensive waged by CCP against the Soviet Communist Party, charging it with betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and attempting to wrest the spiritual leadership of the international Communist movement from the grasp of Moscow. CCP was on the attack; and the Soviet Communist Party found itself hard pressed to stand this ideological onslaught, so that there was an acute need to remove this menace from Peking, either by destroying CCP, or by forcing it to shut up. In the recent years, while Peking has remained the most militant voice against Moscow, it is no longer an ideological challenge from CCP against the Soviet Communist Party, but has become

a conventional non-ideological condemnation from PRC against the expansion of USSR. Such a change makes Peking a far less dangerous enemy; for such condemnations are, instead of being offensive in nature, merely common-sense defensive alarm-calls of people under threat. It is not an intolerable voice. Even if Peking does not make such alarm-calls, some other country might make similar noises. So there is no imperative reason to "solve the Peking problem."

Therefore, Moscow must have gradually modified its view on Peking. PRC is no longer a menace, but merely another player in the traditional game of balance-of-power. There is always room for another player in the game, and there is always the possibility that this player be played against another, just like France may be played against the United States. It is of course not immediately possible for Moscow to re-establish anything like friendship with Peking; but it is no longer unthinkable, and it is no longer undesirable. Any step in this direction would strengthen Moscow's position in the international scene; and, if somehow some sort of alliance could be re-established between Moscow and Peking, the road to World Revolution would be greatly brightened.

From the viewpoint of Peking, detente with Moscow would also clearly offer many advantages. The removal of danger from military attacks would enable Peking to spend its limited resources on economic reconstruction and to deal with the Taiwan issue; and it would eventually allow Peking to develop its own expansionism in Southeast Asia. But Peking has stood firm in its anti-Soviet stand. The reason is simple. Peking

is genuinely alarmed at the prospects of the success of Soviet expansionism. Peking is not even certain that it can be prevented with a determined alliance of PRC-USA-Japan-West Europe; and feels certain that, if PRC accepts a detente with Moscow for the sake of immediate advantages, it would help the Russians along their way to world conquest. It is true that Peking might jump on the wagon and become, as it tried to do thirty years ago, a partner in this victorious march. But, Peking has no difficulty in visualizing the position of PRC after the march is completed and the conquest is complete. The partner would, without any doubt, become another victim.

Therefore, while Peking would probably want to improve its relations with Moscow to such an extent that Moscow no longer poses a military threat to PRC security, Peking is highly unlikely to change its policy of giving alarm calls against Soviet expansionism and trying to promote an alliance of all other powers to contain it.

Under these circumstances, the Peking-Moscow relationship would probably be maintained more or less at the status quo for a very long time. Moscow would make some overtures, but Peking would not really soften its position further. The military threat from the north would not be severe or imminent, but it would not really be removed. Moscow of course could consider removing it altogether; but it would not want to do so without getting a reciprocal reconciliatory move from Peking. For, a unilateral backing-down would enhance Peking's international position; and, what is more important, giving PRC freedom to concentrate on economic construction and on

it is conceivable that Peking would choose to give up its friendship with Washington, and to go ahead with its pressures against Taiwan. However, in the current international situation, and in the foreseeable future, Peking would have so much need -- to the point of dependency -- for American friendship, that it is highly unlikely that Peking would choose such a course. There is simply too much to lose and too little to gain.

Let us look a little more closely into the bilateral relationships.

1. PRC-US relationship. In retrospect, a wise man might nod his head and say that Peking-Washington friendship is a most logical development which all wise men should have expected long ago -- even though he himself probably had not expected it to develop so fast.

John Foster Dulles said that the CCP rule in mainland China was a "passing phase." That wishful thinking was for many years the basis of Washington's policy towards China. It faded, along with KMT's hope of counterattack against PRC. What continued to prevent PRC-US detente was Mao's crazy policies -- the Three Red Banners, the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, the Cultural Revolution, and the over-zealous efforts to help North Vietnam conquer South Vietnam. When the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, and when the United States got ready to withdraw from Indochina, the stage was set for the long-delayed growth of PRC-US detente. And, when Mao died and the pragmatic faction seized the leadership of CCP, PRC-US

friendship became a certainty.

That this friendship was, and is, destined to grow, is of course primarily because of the menace posed by Soviet Imperialism. The Western countries were slowly but definitely losing its superiority over the Soviet bloc. Containment is no longer effective on all fronts. The "brink-of-war" strategy of Dulles, employed for the last time by John Kennedy in the 1962 Cuban crisis, is no longer practicable. Russians and their henchmen in Havana and Hanoi can quite freely expand their influence through military means in Africa, Indochina, South Yemen and Afghanistan; and the Americans can do little more than wringing their own hands.

On the other hand, PRC has suffered, and is still suffering, more from Russian aggressiveness than the Americans have. While Peking has boldly taken 'punitive action' against the provocations of Hanoi along the border, nothing of the sort is contemplated, for obvious reasons, against much more outrageous provocations by the Russians from the north.

It is not hard to see that Soviet expansionism cannot be stopped or contained by the United States alone, or even in alliance with West Europe and Japan. It is also not hard to see that PRC cannot do much against Soviet expansionism alone. While the Russians have not yet gained the overwhelming superiority over the Western countries, PRC would probably be able to survive like Yugoslavia; but, once there is no formidable opponent on the Soviet horizon, PRC cannot but

succumb to Russian domination. Thus, it is only natural for PRC and the U.S. to edge towards each other, in the hope that a combination of the two big nations, together with an extended alliance with Japan and West Europe, might somehow stop Soviet expansionism, or at least gain more time during which the anti-Soviet countries could become strengthened, and Soviet Russia itself might be weakened or change into a less malignant growth.

Seen in this context, the apparently deplorable flowering of PRC-US friendship is not only something that one has to accept with a sigh, but actually a necessary development that one should greet with a cheer. It was not an easy move for either side; but they did it. And, once the flower has started to bloom, there seems to be nothing that can cause it to wither.

In practical aspects, PRC of course benefit more from this friendship than the United States. Most of the things that Peking yearn for can be supplied by the Americans: technology, industrial equipment, weapons, intelligence, market for PRC products. PRC does not have much to offer in return; but it does not really matter. If PRC can help maintain the status quo in the Korean Peninsula, if PRC can indirectly protect the western flank of Japan, if PRC can gradually supply Japan with oil so that Japan could depend less upon the troubled Mid-East oil from a long and endangered shipping line, if PRC can keep half-a-million Soviet troops in Siberia, and if PRC can also more or less keep Hanoi from overrunning Southeast Asia, then the Americans would be more than satisfied with this new friend.

There is no doubt that Americans want to help PRC get stronger so that it would increase its capacity for these tasks. They do not want to rush things too quickly, however, because of three reasons: 1. they do not want to provoke the Russians too much; 2. they do not want too much drain on the American economy which is not very robust; and 3. they do not want PRC to grow strong too quickly, so much so that Peking's need for American friendship would soon dwindle. In case that this happens, PRC might engage in its own expansionism, and might start working on the Taiwan issue in spite of American admonishment.

2. ROC-US relationship. Needless to say, ROC owes a lot to the Americans for its prosperity, and indeed for its existence in the past three decades. What the U.S. owes ROC is basically just a moral obligation. To disown a loyal ally is betrayal, even if such an act does not really hurt that old ally. So, to keep peace with their own conscience, Americans do consider the continuous security of Taiwan as a serious moral obligation. If Taipei should try to establish a linkage with Moscow, Americans would feel greatly relieved to be freed from this obligation.

Though outraged by the betrayal, though far less trusting than before, Taipei authorities and Taiwan people have basically maintained their loyalty and goodwill towards the United States. When in their more rational moods, they recognize that this development is quite inevitable, and not quite so disastrous as it might seem. The American military

protection is withdrawn, but the position of ROC is not in any imminent danger. The U.S. is still a friend; and, as PRC has become a friend of the U.S., perhaps "the friend of a friend cannot be a dangerous enemy."

But, obviously, there are future potential dangers from Peking, now that Washington is no longer committed to defend Taiwan, and is taking the position that the Taiwan issue is just an internal problem of the Chinese people. So, Taipei would have to depend as heavily as before upon American protection from this danger, only in a different way. It can only hope that the friendship between ROC and the U.S. is kept strong enough so that the Americans would be bound by their moral obligation, and that the friendship between the U.S. and the PRC is also strong enough so that the Americans would have an effective restraining influence over Peking on the Taiwan issue.

C. Issue of Orthodoxy

One crucial factor in the development of unification of China is the issue of orthodoxy. To casual foreign observers, this may seem to be a technical matter not worthy of being considered too seriously when so many substantial matters of vital importance are at stake. Even to the majority of the Chinese people, this is not an important thing. What does it matter, after all, whether the nation is called "People's Republic of China" or "Republic of China"? What does it matter

whether the national flag displays five-stars or a white-sun? Nevertheless, for the leaders of PRC and ROC, this is in fact a matter of paramount importance. The legality and orthodoxy of their respective regimes are not negotiable; they might compromise on matters of vital substantial interest, but not on this matter. Peking has shown a willingness to give concessions on all other things, but the only thing that it insists upon is that Taipei must accept the name of PRC and the five-star flag for a unified China. Taipei's position on this matter is equally rigid and adamant: abolishing the name and the flag of ROC is simply out of the question.

For closer observers, this rigidity of both sides on such an insubstantial matter is of course readily understandable. CCP started to fight against the ROC in 1927, 'liberated' the mainland province and established its own regime of PRC in 1949, and is committed to complete this process of 'liberation' and incorporate the last province, Taiwan, into the PRC regime. Extending the PRC legality to Taiwan and flying the five-star flag over Taipei is exactly CCP's aim; and any sort of unification that does not achieve this aim is definitely not acceptable.

For the KMT, the matter is also clearly cut. KMT established ROC in 1911, and the orthodoxy of this regime has never been interrupted, inspite of the invasion of the Japanese, and inspite of losing the practical control of mainland province to CCP. While the proportion of the area under ROC rule and the area under PRC rule is plainly not in favor of ROC's claim

to legality over the whole of China, this is, to the mind of KMT leaders and their supporters, merely a "situation in the current period," which cannot be advanced as a "decisive reason" for the abolition of the ROC legality and orthodoxy.

The survival of Taiwan as a viable political entity is of course an important aim; but, compared with the maintenance of ROC orthodoxy, it is only secondary in importance. When the worst comes to the worst, KMT would fight a desperate war against CCP for the defence of Taiwan, but it would not give up the ROC orthodoxy. The ship can be abandoned, but not surrendered. It is not dishonorable to be defeated, but it is dishonorable to surrender without fight.

This, as mentioned before, is the mentalities of PRC and ROC leaders. As they are the ones who make policies in Peking and Taipei, such rigid attitudes would of course prevail. However, as also mentioned before, to the majority of Chinese people, this matter of legality and orthodoxy is not really important. It is silly to allow this issue to block national unification, when and if no other serious block exists in more practical aspects. When time goes on, when the leaderships in Peking and Taipei pass into the hands of a younger generation, who are more concerned with the practical interests of the whole nation, rather than committed to the legality-inviolability of their respective regimes, then there is a possibility to downgrade the importance of the issue of orthodoxy; then it would be possible for both sides to get ready to make mutual concessions on such matters as the name of the unified

nation and the design of the national flag. It is not inconceivable that future leaders in Peking and Taipei would say, "China must be unified, for this is the common wish of the Chinese people; and, since neither side wants to accept the orthodoxy of the other side, let us create a new orthodoxy. Let us hold a nation-wide general-election, promulgate a new Constitution, adopt a new national name and a new national flag. Both PRC and ROC belong to the history, and a unified China should make a new start."

D. "Taiwanization" and ROC Stability

For obvious reasons, this future trend to downgrade the importance of the existing orthodoxies will run stronger in Taiwan than in the mainland. While the ROC leadership has remained in the hands of KMT leaders who moved to Taipei thirty years ago, in Taiwan the 'mainlanders' are outnumbered by local Taiwanese. Some of the Taiwanese have been carrying on a disreputable Movement for Taiwan Independence, which can be ignored. More important, the KMT leadership, especially in recent years under Chiang Ching-kuo's hands, has conscientiously been promoting the political status of the Taiwanese, in order to achieve a greater degree of harmony and sense of unity among the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. This is what is sometimes called a process of "Taiwanization."

So far, the process of Taiwanization has been going along at a creeping pace. At the 'leadership level,' it is probably

around 15% to 20% 'Taiwanized'; at the administrative level, it is about 30 to 40%; but at the local levels, it is already about 60 to 70%. This process will probably stabilize at 50% at the leadership level, 60% at the administrative level, and 80% at the local levels; and it will probably take about ten more years for Taiwanization to reach this level of stabilization.

In the meantime, there is the question of the 'stability' of Taiwan. Before the process of Taiwanization reaches its reasonable level of stabilization, there is always the possibility, however remote, of trouble arising from the sense of discontent and frustration of the Taiwanese people. This is unlikely, mainly due to the popularity of Chiang Ching-kuo and his policies. But here is, paradoxically, the potential danger of instability; for there is the inescapable problem of a successor to Chiang, and there is nobody in Taiwan, whether mainlander or Taiwanese, who enjoys a popularity remotely comparable to Chiang Ching-kuo's, or an ability remotely comparable to his ability to control the vital organs of the Government, the Party and the Army.

Chiang Ching-kuo may carry on for many many years of course; on the other hand, a man approaching 70 years of age could become inactive any time.

Assuming that Chiang continues to enjoy good health, and assuming that Taiwanization proceeds without any serious disorder, Taiwan would not suffer agonies of instability on account of internal causes. But its stability could of course

be upset by external causes, such as strong offensive pressures from PRC.

Assuming again that no strong offensive pressures come from PRC in the next decade, and the process of Taiwanization is more or less completed when Chiang Ching-kuo eventually relinquishes his leadership of ROC, the new leadership would probably be characterized by two new inclinations, which would be contradictory in nature so far as the unification of China is concerned.

On the one hand, Taiwanization would have been carried to such an extent that loyalty to the ROC legality and orthodoxy, and the emotional ties to the mainland are relatively weakened. Even the 'mainlanders' in the new leadership would be primarily 'second-generation mainlanders' whose memory about the mainland is vacant or vague, and whose real sense of belonging is to Taiwan. These leaders, Taiwanese or otherwise, will not have much of a 'sentiment of Chinese nationalism, and will not see much sense in the call for a unified China.' They would be more inclined to keep Taiwan as an independent political entity, under the name of ROC or some other name.

On the other hand, these new leaders, and the people under their rule, would also be less committed to the legality and orthodoxy of ROC. A change of the national name and the national flag would not appear to be such a horrible thought as it does to the present leaders and the present ROC supporters. Thus, if it should appear to be imperative to give up the legality of ROC for the sake of avoiding an untenable

situation, or even a bloodbath in Taiwan, the new leadership would be much more inclined to yield under pressure, rather than to fight to an honorable but disastrous defeat.

These two potential inclinations in a future Taiwan appear to be contradictory; but it does not mean that they would tend to 'cancel out' each other. Rather, it means that, when pressures from Peking are not menacing, the future Taipei leadership would tend to try to develop towards a sort of de facto independence -- or even a form of real independence which implies waiving the claim over the mainland. And, when Peking pressures become unbearable, the future Taipei leadership would tend to agree to give up the ROC orthodoxy, rather than to stand firm on this issue.

E. "Five Modernization" and PRC Stability

While the slogan in PRC is "Four Modernization" -- modernization of industry, agriculture, science & technology and national defence -- the real task of course must include the 'Fifth Modernization': Political Modernization.

Political modernization means essentially development in the following three fields: Rule-by-law; Liberalization; Democraticization.

1. Rule-by-law is a vital principle that has been disregarded in PRC, especially in the decade between 1966 and 1976. Lawlessness was indeed advanced by Mao as a virtue, or rather, as a prerogative of the supreme leader. The new PRC leadership has started to establish the principle of rule-by-law; but it has a very long way to go. Rule-by-law does

least not at the national level. However, it is possible to advance gradually at the local level, to cultivate 'grass-root democracy,' and to educate the people in the practice of the democratic system. And, eventually, a sort of workable system of national political parties might be given the chance to develop.

Total achievement of rule-by-law, liberalization and democraticization in China probably cannot be expected in many decades, or even centuries; but certain levels of achievement in these three fields would be needed for PRC to ensure its stability in the long run. Just as a conceptual remark, one might say that, if rule-by-law approaches a degree of 70% success, if liberalization approaches 50%, and if democratization approaches 30%, PRC would have achieved a comfortable level of political modernization, which would be a sound foundation for stability.

Stability would of course depend upon other factors, notably national security and tolerable economy. These are exactly the goals of the 'Four Modernizations.' Much has been said about this matter, by people in PRC and those outside of it; and it is not a subject to be treated fully in this paper. But the success, or the lack of it, of these goals has a direct bearing upon the prospects of unification of China.

To put it in an over-simplified way, if PRC can become so successful in its 'modernization of national defence' so that there is no more fear of a Soviet invasion, and can also become so successful in its economic modernization so that the

standard of living of PRC people is rapidly raised to close the gap between PRC and ROC, then the likelihood of a national unification would increase. On the other hand, if national defence and economic reconstruction remain in a state of backwardness, then it is likely that national unification will remain a dream.¹

F. Sentiment of Nationalism

The sentiment of nationalism is a basic driving force towards unification. Taiwan has never been an independent nation; and most Taiwanese people do recognize that they are Chinese. As the Shanghai Communique acknowledges, people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait affirm that there is only one China. It is only natural for all Chinese to be in favor of a unified nation.

However, this sentiment -- so far as the unification of PRC and ROC is concerned, should not be overstressed. In the history of China, there were long periods when the country was divided into two or more political entities. In fact, China is a multi-national country, and the Chinese people have experienced multi-regime periods. The division of PRC and ROC has lasted thirty years; there is no historical reason to assume that the division cannot last for another thirty years -- or even three hundred years. In fact, the longer the division, the weaker the cohesion for unification. Twenty years ago, for instance, Peking had a stronger urge to 'liberate' Taiwan, and Taipei had a stronger desire to recover the mainland. Now, this urge and this desire still exist, but already in a much milder form.

But this does not mean that, when the division is prolonged, the sentiment of nationalism will fade irrevocably. It will always be there, even though lying dormant. When and if circumstances become favorable for unification, this sentiment would be rekindled and reappear as a strong moving force.

VI. POSSIBILITIES IN THE FUTURE

Now that we have analyzed the decisive factors for the unification of China, we should take a step further to try to explore the possible developments of these factors in future years, and also to explore the possible ways that can lead to this unification.

A. Possible Developments of Decisive Factors

It is infeasible and unnecessary to try to list all possible developments of the factors; and we have to narrow our attention to those that appear to be within the limit of reasonable expectation.

1. Peking-Moscow-Taipei triangle. This factor might develop the following possibilities:

- a. PRC-USSR hot war;
- b. PRC-USSR cold war;
- c. PRC-USSR cold peace;
- d. PRC-USSR detente;
- e. PRC-USSR tacit understanding in expansionism;
- f. PRC-USSR alliance;
- g. ROC-USSR hostility;
- h. ROC-USSR mutual neglect;
- i. ROC-USSR tacit understanding in PRC containment;
- j. ROC-USSR linkage.

2. Peking-Washington-Taipei triangle. This factor might develop the following possibilities:

- a. PRC-US relationship breakdown;
- b. PRC-US relationship cooling off;
- c. PRC-US relationship kept lukewarm;
- d. PRC-US relationship warming up to informal alliance;
- e. PRC-US relationship developing into alliance;
- f. ROC-US relationship breakdown;
- g. ROC-US drifting further apart;
- h. ROC-US relationship kept lukewarm;
- i. ROC-US relationship warming up to greater US commitments;
- j. ROC-US re-establishing some kind of formal ties.

3. Issue of orthodoxy. This factor might develop the following possibilities:

- a. Both Peking and Taipei remain uncompromising;
- b. Peking firm, Taipei compromising;
- c. Taipei firm, Peking compromising;
- d. Both Peking and Taipei become flexible and compromising.

4. "Taiwanization" and ROC stability. This factor might develop the following possibilities:

- a. Losing stability due to Peking offensive pressures;
- b. Losing stability due to eruptions in Taiwanization;
- c. Losing stability due to leadership crisis;
- d. Maintaining fairly high stability without serious crisis;
- e. Increasing stability.

5. "Five Modernization" and PRC stability. This factor might develop the following possibilities:

- a. Losing stability due to failure of Political Modernization;
- b. Losing stability due to failure of Economic Modernization;
- c. Losing stability due to USSR offensive pressures;
- d. Losing stability due to leadership crisis;
- e. Maintaining fairly high stability without crisis;
- f. Increasing stability.

6. Sentiment of Nationalism. This factor, so far as the unification of PRC and ROC is concerned, might develop the following possibilities:

- a. Losing its potency due to prolonged division;
- b. Losing its potency due to intensified belligerence between PRC and ROC;
- c. Regaining its potency due to realistic hopes of peaceful unification under favorable changes in PRC and ROC;
- d. Becoming gradually dormant but potentially potent in the distant future.

B. Possible Ways for Unification

There are potentially seven ways for the unification of China which fall into three groups: unification through violence, unification through pressure, unification through peaceful evolution.

1. Unification through violence

a. Unification through PRC military action. If PRC should escalate its offensive pressures as outlined in 'III - A', and

if ROC remains defiant and uncompromising, it would eventually lead to PRC military conquest of Taiwan -- basically repeating the historic event of Cheng Cheng-kung (the last general of Ming Dynasty) being vanquished by the Ching Dynasty.

b. Unification through ROC military action. While this may seem less likely than Peking's 'liberating Taiwan by force,' it is not a possibility that should be ruled out entirely. If PRC is greatly weakened by a devastating war against USSR, and/or if the mainland people rise up against CCP rulers under circumstances of political and economic chaos, there would be -- as Taipei has maintained with diminishing credibility over the years -- the possibility for ROC to launch the long-promised military counter-attack and regain control of the mainland.

2. Unification through pressure

a. Unification through PRC pressure and 'total solution'.

When and if Peking is in a position to exert increasingly unbearable pressures, Taipei might yield and agree to negotiations on the 'total solution' basis. That is to say, the issue of orthodoxy will be dealt with as the foremost issue. Taipei would be compelled to abandon the name of 'Republic of China,' and the ROC national flag. Reluctantly but peacefully, Taiwan would be incorporated into PRC.

b. Unification through PRC pressure and 'phased solution'.

Peking might realize that the 'total solution' is too much of a bitter-pill for Taipei to swallow, and might therefore decide

to adopt a softer and milder approach by offering a 'phased solution,' i.e. incorporation of Taiwan into PRC in gradual steps. The issue of orthodoxy might be deferred for negotiation in the last stage, instead of insisting upon dealing with it as the foremost issue.' While exerting subtle pressures with carefully veiled threats, Peking might first demand Taipei to come to the negotiation table for talks on practical (and apparently mutually-beneficial) issues, such as the establishment of direct communication services, the exchange of civilian visitors, direct trade of PRC oil for ROC products, economic and cultural exchanges etc. Taipei would regard this approach as 'sugar-coated poison,' but might have to go along due to fear of harsher and blunter pressures from Peking.

When Taipei is induced into this 'first-stage negotiations,' Peking would urge it to enter the 'second-stage negotiations,' which would still be quite low-keyed and soft-toned; but Peking might demand the exchange of governmental delegations, the mutual stationing of parliamentary-observers and 'liaison officers' at ministerial level, the establishment of various 'co-ordination commissions,' etc. When and if Peking gains its way in effectively bringing Taiwan under its power, it will arrange for the 'final-stage negotiations,' to solve the issue of orthodoxy, and Taiwan would be formally incorporated into PRC.

c. Unification through ROC political counter-offensive.

While this may seem to be, in the eyes of most observers, a far-fetched and imaginary way for the unification of China, it is indeed a practical approach, and could be the best

strategy for Taipei to adopt for the sake of ROC survival and national salvation. As outlined in 'IV-C', Taipei could devise an active strategy of political counter-offensive by plunging into negotiations with Peking, but turning them into a political struggle against Communist ideology and the CCP misgovernment of the mainland. Instead of being dragged around reluctantly and passively in negotiations summoned by Peking, KMT could call for conferences on a national scale and put CCP on trial for its bankrupt ideology and its miserable performance in the mainland. Even if Peking is alert enough to veto the convening of such conferences, even if Taipei is obliged to enter into negotiations with Peking on a bilateral basis, Taipei representatives can still make use of such talks as a public platform to launch its political offensives against Communist ideology and CCP misgovernment; and the arguments would draw national and international attention. They would have penetrating influence spreading far and wide in the mainland; the people would strongly, though silently, support Taipei's denunciations against Communism and CCP regime; and the more courageous human-rights fighters among the mainland people would be further encouraged and inspired in their valiant struggle, fighting against CCP in actual collaboration with KMT, though there would probably be no actual contact. There would even be KMT-sympathizers among the rank-and-file CCF members, and in the PLA. What would happen after things develop to such a stage is of course difficult to predict. CCP might gradually yield

to such political pressures and change its course to accommodate the demands from KMT and the mainland people; or it might remain intransigent and eventually be overwhelmed and overthrown by the people and the KMT. Whether the subsequent newly unified nation is called the Republic of China or by some new name does not matter. It would have been unification through ROC pressure.

3. Unification through steady evolution

a. Unification through mutual accommodation. It is not impossible that both Peking and Taipei would not, or could not, exert offensive pressures against the opponent, but would rather allow things to develop in a relatively relaxed way. PRC-ROC relationship may gradually thaw, more or less along the line of the relationship between West and East Germanies. A point might be reached when both sides would regard each other as practically independent countries with special historic-ties and a special friendship. Out of those ties and out of that friendship, there might grow a mutual desire for 'marriage.' While the two areas would still have serious differences in many respects -- especially in ideological orientation, political system, social structure, economic structure and standard-of-living -- it might be possible to work out a kind of constitutional arrangement so that the two parts of China could be loosely united as one nation.

b. Unification through natural identification. It is also not impossible that PRC and ROC would remain separate for

a very very long period, during which both sides evolve in such a way so that differences as mentioned in the last paragraph gradually melt away, and the two parts of China become essentially homogeneous, and people in both parts find there is not much sense in keeping the two parts separate. Then there would be a relatively painless and effortless process to bring about peaceful unification.

VII. PROBABILITIES IN THE FUTURE

In the last section, an attempt was made to analyse the possibilities for the decisive factors for unification of China, and the possible ways that could lead to this unification. Now, a further attempt is to be made to evaluate these possibilities and to predict the most probable combinations of the decisive factors and ways.

A. Evaluation of Individual Decisive Factors

1. Peking-Moscow-Taipei triangle

a. PRC-USSR hot war. Barring any unforeseeable new element, a major war between PRC and USSR is a fast-diminishing possibility. Moscow lost several chances in the past decade for launching such a war; and no favorable opportunity is likely to appear in coming years. The present USSR leaders are too old and too fragile to have the vitality for such a difficult task. Besides, there is no more need for this drastic action, as there is no more an ideological challenge from CCP, and the confrontation has changed in nature, becoming a conventional contention between great powers in the game of global balance-of-power, a game that can be played without going into a major war. Moscow is currently quite satisfied with their progress of expansionism, and would not want to upset the present strategy with a troublesome war against PRC. Border wars will continue to be quite possible of course, but not a major war, or a punitive nuclear strike. When the present Moscow leaders pass from the scene,

the new leaders in Kremlin would be busy with internal problems for a long while, and would not launch a major war against PRC either.

b. PRC-USSR cold war. This is what one might call the present relationship between PRC and USSR. Both sides are making some efforts to contain the other side, and both sides make recriminative charges against the other side. This state of affairs may continue indefinitely; but there are already some signs that the PRC-USSR may move gradually to the next possibility.

c. PRC-USSR cold peace. As indicated in 'V-A-1', Moscow probably would want to lower the degree of hostility between PRC and USSR further; but Peking probably would want to maintain its firm stand against Soviet expansionism, because it regards this as a necessary attitude to sharpen global vigilance against Soviet marches, which would eventually bring disaster to PRC itself. So, a PRC-USSR cold-peace is unlikely in the present stage, in spite of small conciliatory gestures from both sides. Those gestures from Moscow are probably real attempts to bring the PRC-USSR relationship down to the level of cold peace; but those gestures from Peking are probably only designed to alleviate the PRC-USSR hostility slightly so as to ensure that Moscow would not take major military actions against PRC, especially in a period when PRC has taken, and may again take, military actions against Vietnam.

However, when and if Peking thinks that Soviet

expansionism has been successfully contained, so much so that it is no longer a primary danger for the future of PRC, it would be very likely that Peking will then seek to bring its relationship with Moscow to the level of cold peace -- or even to the level of detente.

d. PRC-USSR detente. That would be the normal state of relationship between two neighboring powers; but, given the danger of Soviet expansionism to eventual security of PRC, it is quite unthinkable in the foreseeable future. When and if USSR is so tamed that its expansionism becomes a dead or dying issue, PRC might move to this level of relationship, but not before.

e. PRC-USSR tacit understanding in expansionism. Provided the Peking leadership becomes so foolish in some future time as to be unable to see the eventual danger that a USSR success in other areas would pose upon PRC security, and provided that PRC itself becomes strong enough to indulge in its own expansionism, the Peking leadership might make the fatal mistake of entering into a sort of tacit understanding with USSR so that each may push on its own expansionism in its sphere of influence. But it is hard to imagine a future Peking leadership being so foolish; so this possibility may be disregarded.

f. PRC-USSR alliance. If the future Peking leadership in this assumption is even more foolish and more anxious for its own expansionism than described in the last paragraph, it may go a step further and seek a new alliance with USSR,

one similar in nature to the alliance between Nazi Germany and Japan. But this is even more unlikely than the possibility of a tacit understanding for expansionism.

g. ROC-USSR hostility. Such hostility would be possible under three different sets of circumstances:

(1) When and if USSR, in an active strategy for the encirclement and containment of PRC, moves to force Taipei to submit itself to a sort of military alliance with USSR and to allow Russian bases in Taiwan;

(2) When and if USSR launches a major war against PRC, and the sentiment of nationalism in Taiwan compels itself to take the side of PRC against a hated foreign invader; or,

(3) When and if USSR wages a successful major war against PRC (during which ROC maintains neutrality) and then occupies a large part of China mainland.

All three sets of circumstances are highly unlikely situations; so we can practically rule out the possibility of ROC-USSR hostility in the foreseeable future.

h. ROC-USSR mutual neglect. This is the situation in the past three decades, and is likely to continue indefinitely, even though both sides have made, and possibly will make, occasional veiled hints of some sort of improvement in this relationship. Such hints are in truth merely diplomatic feints to try to mislead opponents into suspecting that Moscow has a 'Taiwan Card' in its sleeve, or that Taipei has a 'Russia Card' in its sleeve. These cards do not exist in reality.

i. ROC-USSR tacit understanding in PRC containment.

While there is no option for Moscow to establish any ties with Taipei, and vice versa, ROC and USSR do in fact share a common interest in containing the growth of strength of PRC and the expansion of influence of Peking in Asia or elsewhere. But this is just a coincidental parallelism in external goals, and it is unlikely to develop into any tacit understanding in the containment efforts.

j. ROC-USSR linkage. As analyzed before, such a linkage is in fact impossible.

2. Peking-Washington-Taipei triangle

a. PRC-US relationship breakdown. When and if Peking escalates its pressures against Taipei to the final stage of the invasion of Taiwan, there would be a breakdown of the PRC-US relationship. But this is mostly unlikely in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, if this breakdown does happen, it is not impossible to recover after the Taiwan issue is settled. Washington's 'protection over Taiwan through friendship with Peking' is not absolute.

b. PRC-US relationship cooling off. When and if Peking starts to escalate its pressures against Taipei to the degree of military action, Washington would be gravely concerned; and, while trying to admonish Peking against such actions, the U.S. might resume or step up its supply of purely defensive weapons to Taipei. That would mean a quick cooling off of the PRC-US relationship. The degree of likelihood of this possibility is directly linked with the degree of likelihood of

Peking's escalation to military action against Taiwan.

c. PRC-US relationship kept lukewarm. The current PRC-US relationship might be described as 'lukewarm.' It has a strong momentum to warm up steadily; but it may also remain at this lukewarm level, if one of the following three sets of circumstances should appear:

- (1) PRC exerting too strong non-military pressures against ROC;
- (2) PRC losing stability through leadership crisis and reversal to Maoist dogmatic line;
- (3) PRC losing stability through economic catastrophe.

These three developments, while all possible, are all ~~not~~ very likely. They will be discussed in later passages in this Section.

e. PRC-US relationship warming up to informal alliance. This is by far the most likely development for this relationship in coming years. Peking and Washington have such strong mutual needs and mutual interests in global strategy and other aspects, that it is vital for both of them to take care to see that nothing happens to thwart this warming-up. The degree of warmth would depend largely upon the seriousness of Russian menace as perceived in Peking and Washington. This seriousness is apt to be increasing in coming years, so the warmth of PRC-US relationship is apt to be increasing correspondingly in coming years.

f. PRC-US relationship developing into alliance. This would happen when and if both Peking and Washington perceive that a military showdown against Moscow is inevitable and imminent. Such a situation is certainly possible, but it does not seem to be highly probable. Moscow, while pushing ahead with its expansionism, would have taken precautions along every step of the way to forestall such an alliance. It would try its best to keep Peking and Washington from drawing the firm conclusion that a final military showdown is inevitable and imminent, and that the formation of a PRC-US alliance would provoke the anger of Moscow and precipitate this showdown. Therefore, unless Moscow has become so arrogant that it does not care any more whether its opponents -- the United States, West Europe, Japan and PRC -- brace themselves and embrace each other firmly for the final showdown against USSR, it is likely that Moscow will keep maneuvering in such a way so that Peking and Washington would keep putting off the formation of an alliance.

g. ROC-US relationship drifting further apart. This is possible in the event of any sort of Moscow-Taipei linkage, which is not a real possibility. Washington might also further reduce its ties with Taiwan, if it gets ready to allow a PRC-takeover of Taiwan. This again is not a strong possibility. For, if Peking steps up its military pressures, Washington would be under strong pressures from the U.S. people to stand firm and remonstrate against Peking military

actions. And, if Peking can bring about a unification without resorting to military actions, Washington would probably only readjust its ties with Taiwan after a political solution is agreed upon between Peking and Taipei. In any event, it does not seem to be very likely for Washington to turn its tail and abandon Taiwan voluntarily, with or without military pressures from Peking.

h. ROC-US relationship kept lukewarm. This is the present situation, and it is likely to remain this way indefinitely. Washington might play the role of an intermediary between Peking and Taipei in the promotion of a peaceful unification, as well the role of a referee in a boxing match in the prevention of 'illegal' blows from either contestant.

i. ROC-US relationship warming up to greater US commitments. This could happen under two sets of circumstances:

(1) When and if Peking escalates its military pressures against Taiwan in defiance of Washington remonstrances, which result in an outraged American public opinion, calling for the government to bolster Taiwan defences; or

(2) When and if Moscow attempts to bring Taiwan into its sphere of influence, and both Taipei and Peking wish Washington would help Taiwan in its efforts to resist Moscow pressure.

Neither set of circumstances is a high possibility; so it is not very likely that the ROC-US relationship will warm up to greater US commitments in Taiwan.

j. ROC-US reestablishing some kind of formal ties. This would happen under two sets of circumstances:

(1) When and if there is a serious breakdown in the PRC-US relationship; or

(2) When and if Peking practically gives up its hope of bringing about a unification, and gives tacit approval to Washington to have more formal ties with Taipei, just like West Germany giving approval for Washington to have formal ties with East Germany.

Again, neither set of circumstances is a high possibility.

3. Issue of orthodoxy

a. Both Peking and Taipei remain uncompromising. This is the current situation, and is likely to persist indefinitely.

b. Peking firm, Taipei compromising. This would happen when and if Peking finds itself in a position to exert increasing pressures against Taipei, if Taipei finds itself practically helpless in an untenable position, and if Taipei has a new leadership that does not attach so much importance to the issue of orthodoxy. Such a development may seem not quite possible now; but, five or ten years from now on, the situation might appear quite different.

c. Taipei firm, Peking compromising. This may seem to be even less likely; but it is possible that, when Peking finds it impossible to bring military pressure to bear, and impossible to bring about a political solution of the Taiwan problem without yielding on the orthodoxy issue, it would decide that, after all, there is no importance in adopting a new national flag and a new national name. Then, this

new Peking leadership which does not have a strong feeling on the PRC orthodoxy might offer concessions to Taipei on this issue. This is no more far-fetched than the possibility of 'Peking firm, Taipei compromising.'

d. Both become flexible and compromising. Such a development would be likely when and if both Peking and Taipei work towards a steady evolution leading to peaceful unification. This possibility is distinctly there, but it exists only in the remote future, not in the foreseeable future.

4. "Taiwanization" and ROC stability

a. Losing stability due to Peking offensive pressures.

When and if Peking does indeed escalate its offensive pressures against Taiwan along the line described in 'III-A', to the extent of taking increasingly severe military actions, it would be quite difficult for Taiwan to maintain its stability. However, as is shown in previous passages, it is highly improbable that Peking can adopt this strategy without jeopardizing its own security. When conditions are more favorable than the current conditions, Peking would surely gradually increase its non-military pressures against ROC; but, so long as they are non-military, ROC would be able to sustain them without losing much stability, and Washington would not regard such pressures as so malignant that they should prevent the further warming-up in PRC-US relationship. Rather, Washington would tend to promote this warming-up so that it would be in a better position to persuade Peking

not to go further into military pressures. Thus, while there is no assurance that ROC can maintain its present level of stability, there is also no danger that its stability will be completely upset by intolerable pressures from PRC.

b. Losing stability due to eruptions in Taiwanization.

The process of Taiwanization is not entirely free from potential dangers. However, Chiang Ching-kuo's personal prestige and popularity is strong enough to ensure that there is no serious trouble when he remains at the head of ROC leadership. It is difficult to foresee the progress of Taiwanization under a new leadership. Some unsettling frictions seem to be inevitable; but probably ROC stability would not be totally disrupted by such eruptions. Much would depend upon the degree of success of Taiwanization when the leadership is eventually passed from Chiang Ching-kuo to someone else.

c. Losing stability due to leadership crisis. Chiang Ching-kuo has enjoyed relatively good health, but he is no longer a young man. Sooner or later the reins of ROC have to be passed to some new leader; but who this new leader will be remains unclear. If Chiang succeeds in grooming a capable and popular successor by the time he relinquishes his hand on the reins, there would be no leadership crisis. Otherwise there will be a problem which may or may not be very serious. It is practically impossible to assess this factor at the present stage.

d. Maintaining fairly high stability without serious crisis.

So far as we can see, this is the most likely possibility in

the future years of ROC. But, to be realistic, no one can offer assurance that Peking will never be in a position to exert increasingly intolerable offensive pressures, that there will never be a PRC-USSR detente to allow Peking to concentrate on the Taiwan issue, that the American 'protection of Taiwan through PRC-US friendship' will always be effective, and that there will never be disastrous eruptions in the process of Taiwanization or crippling struggles in a leadership crisis.

e. Increasing stability. This seems unlikely, for the simple reason that ROC has maintained a very high level of stability which is hard to excel.

5. "Five Modernizations" and PRC stability

a. Losing stability due to failure of Political Modernization

This is not a very likely possibility. The new PRC leadership under Deng Xiao-ping is deliberately and conscientiously making gradual progress towards political modernization, at least in the field of rule-by-law and granting more liberties to the people. The Chinese people, as a whole, are very patient, and are relatively easy to feel contented with the slow progress when they compare it with the horrible years under Mao. The brave human-rights fighters in PRC will continue to advocate, as best as they can, the principles of rule-by-law, liberalization and democraticization, and there would be more frictions between this popular movement and the CCP regime; but probably it will be kept under control. Such a movement will serve to urge CCP to go a little faster along the way

of Political Modernization, but probably will not be strong enough to undermine the basic stability of PRC. A general uprising of the people against CCP regime, though conceivable, is not really a high possibility. One of the main reasons is that the mainland is too vast for a general uprising, such as the one in Wuhan in 1967, could be suppressed by the efficient ruling-machine before people in other areas even hear about it.

b. Losing stability due to failure of Economic Modernization.

Deng Xiao-ping is certainly taking the correct direction as he orients PRC towards the Four Modernizations; but a correct direction is not enough to guarantee success. It is certain that PRC cannot really catch up with modern industrial countries by the end of this century, as promised by Peking slogans. But, again, failure to achieve this goal does not mean failure of the program. The program should be deemed successful, if progress is made at a reasonably fast pace, and if the people's standard of living is steadily raised in spite of the population increase. Without going into a detailed study involving a lot of concrete factors, one might make a general forecast on the basis of general performance in the past three decades. In the first decade of PRC, economic reconstruction was fairly successful, in spite of CCP's inexperience in this field. In the second decade, Mao did his best to disrupt PRC economy, with his Three Red Banners and Cultural Revolution; chaotic situations were created, progress was thwarted, population was allowed to grow without restraint. Never-

theless, PRC economy managed to recover with admirable resilience. The first half of the third decade was scarcely better than the second, with Mao and the Gang of Four trying their best to interfere with Chou En-lai's economic efforts; but the economy also managed to struggle along without suffering irrevocable damages. In the past few years, while the PRC leadership has been groping for a sound program, there have been some confusions, but generally there have been good progress. While the population has nearly doubled in thirty years, the standard-of-living has not declined, even though it has also failed to rise. While the mainland people have not had much incentive for hard-working, they have nevertheless managed to feed themselves. Based on this amazing record, it would seem to be reasonable to assume that in the future, when there is no Chairman Mao to deal killing blows against the economy, when there is a sensible population-policy, when there are a correct general direction, a relatively sound program and an improving relationship with the outside world, PRC economy should perform with greater vigor and success than in the past twenty years. It would not mean the kind of success as promised by Peking; but it would probably mean the kind of success that can prevent the losing of stability through economic failure.

c. Losing stability due to USSR offensive pressures.

As shown in previous passages, the menace from Moscow is diminishing in the present stage, and is likely to diminish further in coming years, before Moscow subdues the United

States in the global contest for power. Ten years ago, Moscow might be thinking about the desirability of vanquishing PRC before making any major challenge against the United States. The idea did not look attractive enough; and it has become less so now. It would be unnecessary, indeed silly, for Moscow to waste its resources in a major war against PRC, which could be prolonged and sticky. PRC poses no great danger to USSR security. Even in a future USSR-US showdown, PRC can do little harm to USSR, because the PLA can only be effective in a defensive war fought on PRC territories. It would bog down in Siberia if it dares to invade USSR. And the PRC nuclear armament is, of course, strictly defensive in nature; Peking would never dare to try a pre-emptive strike against USSR. So, while Moscow has moved the PRC issue to its back-burner, there is little likelihood that PRC would lose its stability through Russian pressures.

d. Losing stability due to leadership crisis. In spite of an apparently unified front of the present CCP leadership, leadership crisis in Peking is almost certainly going to happen in coming years. Hua Kuo-feng may lose his position before or after the death of Deng Xiao-ping; there would be another round of intra-Party struggle for the supreme leadership. But the scope of violence and the destructive effects of such a struggle would not be on a comparable level as the Cultural Revolution or the post-Mao purges. The basic stability of PRC would not be seriously damaged. Whoever

emerges at the head of the new Peking leadership would not attempt to revert to Maoist dogmatic line, because that line has fallen into complete bankruptcy in the eyes of the people and the majority of CCP members. No leader would try to consolidate his power with a reversal to that line, because he would know that he could not find sufficient support in the Party, the army and the populace. Although in the present stage, there are still many cadres in the Party who do not wish to see the process of 'de-Maoification' being carried on too fast and too thoroughly, this is mainly because they are afraid that, having gained their positions during the Cultural Revolution period with various sorts of connections with the Gang of Four, they themselves might lose these positions if Chairman Mao and the Thought of Mao-tsetung are completely discredited. Real fanatics who persist in the faith of the Maoist dogmatic line and the loyalty to the dead Chairman are not many.

Thus, there would be leadership crisis in Peking, but it would not seriously affect the stability of the whole country. It would be more or less like the crisis in Moscow that passed the leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev -- a first-rate leadership crisis, but with little change for the national stability.

e. Maintaining fairly high stability without crisis.
This is a very high probability. But in this sense, a leadership crisis that does not jeopardize the national stability is not counted as a crisis.

f. Increasing stability. The PRC today is already enjoying a high degree of stability -- higher than any time in the past thirty years. A further increase is, though not impossible, not very likely; for the Soviet menace is still there, the human-rights movement is making increasing trouble, and there are simply too many things to be done in the Party, in the army, in the government and in the economic field, so that a smooth development is practically inconceivable. Now that Mao's 'New China' has gone, Deng's 'New New-China' is in truth a new dynasty; and any new dynasty of course can hardly be very stable.

6. Sentiment of nationalism

a. Losing its potency due to prolonged division. This is what has happened in the past thirty years, and what would happen in coming years, if the status quo is more or less maintained.

b. Losing its potency due to intensified belligerence between PRC and ROC. When and if such belligerence is revived and the two parts of China confront each other with great enmity, the sentiment of nationalism would be suppressed, at least for the time being.

c. Regaining its potency due to realistic hopes of peaceful unification under favorable changes in PRC and ROC. This is a high possibility if Peking does not indulge in offensive pressures against Taiwan, and eventually a process

of steady evolution towards peaceful unification gets under way. But this is not a possibility in the near future.

d. Becoming gradually dormant but potentially potent in the distant future. This is what is going to happen if nothing happens for a long time either in favor of, or against, the peaceful unification of China. PRC and ROC would simply carry on indefinitely on a separate basis, like West Germany and East Germany. The sentiment of nationalism is not dead, but it is dormant. This could go on for decades, or even centuries. And this is a real possibility.

B. Possible Ways for Unification

1. Unification through violence. As analysed before, unification through PRC military action or ROC military action is a very remote possibility.

2. Unification through pressure

a. Unification through PRC pressure and 'total solution.'

This is practically impossible in the foreseeable future while Chiang Ching-kuo is heading the ROC leadership. It becomes an imponderable possibility after the ROC leadership passes into some new leaders.

b. Unification through PRC pressure and 'phased solution.'

This is not entirely inconceivable provided Washington weakens further in its moral support to Taipei and fails to assume its protective role when Peking escalates its pressures against Taiwan. Again, it is less likely to happen when Chiang Ching-kuo is leading ROC, than when a new leadership takes over in Taipei.

c. Unification through ROC political counter-offensive.

While the opportunity is there, it is highly doubtful whether Taipei has the courage to take it. Members in the ROC leadership who have confidence would try to present this course as an inspired alternative to the conservative course of 'wait and see'; but other members in the leadership who have prudence would condemn such a suggestion as a dangerous gamble, or even as a treacherous plot to sell out ROC. Unless Chiang Ching-kuo himself somehow decides that this courageous approach means the best -- perhaps the only -- way for ROC to achieve long-term survival as well as the recovery of the mainland, there is no hope that Taipei would adopt this active strategy.

3. Unification through steady evolution. Unification through mutual accommodation or through natural identification is possible in the long run, provided nothing happens in the short run; but this is in the remote future, too remote for anyone to foresee its practical shape.

VIII. MOST PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COMING YEARS

In the previous sections, we have attempted to analyze the potential approaches from Peking for the sake of the unification of China, as well as the conceivable reactions from Taipei; we have also made an endeavor to single out the decisive factors for the unification of China, to line up the possibilities for the developments of such factors, and to assess the relative degrees of likelihood of such possibilities. While the whole issue still remains clouded with many uncertainties and unpredictable factors, we might try to sort out, on the basis of the previous analyses, what seem to be the most probable developments in coming years.

A. Most Probable Factor-possibilities (1st time-frame)

For the six decisive factors, their most probable possibilities in the next five years, or perhaps ten years, seem to be the following:

1. PRC-USSR cold war on a low key, and sometimes moving toward the verge of cold peace. ROC-USSR mutual neglect.
2. PRC-US warming up to informal alliance. ROC-US relationship kept lukewarm.
3. Peking and Taipei both uncompromising on orthodoxy issues.
4. ROC maintaining relatively high stability.
5. PRC maintaining relatively high stability.

6. Sentiment of nationalism losing potency through prolonged division.

B. Most Probable Way for Unification (in 1st time-frame)

For the four possible ways of unification, the most probable way in the next five or ten years seems to be 'Unification through PRC pressure and "phased solution"'. While this is shown as the 'most probable way,' it is only considered as such in comparison with the other ways within the five-to-ten year time-frame. In fact, even this 'most probable way' is unlikely to become reality in this time-frame.

If we look further ahead and extend our view into the second time-frame, i.e. roughly 1990 - 2000, then we have a somewhat different combination of most probable factor-possibilities. It is of course a much more misty view, but we might try to see in this mist the likely shapes of things to come.

C. Most Probable Factor-possibilities (in 2nd time-frame)

For the six decisive factors, their most probable possibilities in the last decade of the 20th century seem to be the following:

1. PRC-USSR cold war on a high key, due to the increased menace from Soviet expansionism. ROC-USSR mutual neglect.
2. PRC-US on the verge of formal alliance due to a shared apprehension of Soviet show'down.

3. Peking and Taipei both compromising on orthodoxy issue.
4. ROC maintaining relatively high stability.
5. PRC maintaining relatively high stability.
6. Sentiment of nationalism regaining its potency due to realistic hopes of peaceful unification under favorable changes in PRC and ROC.

D. Most Probable Way for Unification (in 2nd time-frame)

Under those circumstances, the most probable way for unification in the last decade of the 20th century seems to be 'Unification through mutual accommodation.' That is to say, PRC would be prepared to make many concessions, including important concessions on the orthodoxy issue, for the sake of bringing Taiwan into a unified China, which would greatly strengthen the national position in the confrontation against the formidable USSR. Taipei would have a natural inclination to continue to resist this unification; but it may eventually decide that, in the final analysis, PRC and ROC share the same destiny, that if ROC stands by the sideline, watching PRC being vanquished by USSR, it would soon be ROC's turn to be vanquished also. So, Taipei may also make a decision in favor of peaceful unification.

IX. CONCLUSION

From the above analyses, we may draw a brief and tentative general-conclusion: It is highly improbable that the unification of China can materialize in the next five

to ten years, but a peaceful unification is quite feasible in the last decade of the century.

Besides the factors discussed above, another important matter has played a vital role in all these assessments: the future development of Soviet expansionism. It is assumed, in the analyses above, that Soviet expansionism will march on in the coming years, in spite of the efforts of all other nations to contain it. It is assumed however that Moscow will not feel strong enough to force a total showdown before the end of the 20th century. It would take another complicated study to establish the validity of these two assumptions on Soviet expansionism, which is a much broader issue than the unification of China, so much broader that it is a 'conditioning influence' of the unification of China instead of a factor for it. It may very well be that the above-stated two assumptions on Soviet expansionism do not have validity. In that case, our assessment of the most probable developments for China unification in the two time-frames would have to be re-assessed.

- END -